This article proposes an ex ante evaluation of the effects of new labour contracts such as the "Contrat Nouvelle Embauche" (CNE) are expected to have on the French labour market. The lessons we draw from this evaluation are of sufficiently general interest to be applicable to other countries, and might be useful for future reforms of employment protection laws. Using a model that captures the chief characteristics of the French labour market, we estimate the effects these new labour contracts will have on unemployment, employment, and aggregate welfare. As a reference point, we first consider a labour market which consists primarily of two types of contracts: the CDD (fixed-term) and CDI (long-term). We then simulate the impact of introducing CNE type contracts into the non-agricultural trade sector. Drawing from our analysis, the CNE is expected to increase both the hiring and dismissal rates. In the context of the French labour market, it is estimated that the CNE will lead to the creation of 70,000 additional jobs in the long run, but at the cost of a slight deterioration in job-seekers' welfare. In addition, we show that complementing CNE type contracts with a more comprehensive labour reform that (1) reduces the economic cost of firing but (2) offers more generous severance pay is likely to have a significant positive effect on job creation. In particular, we estimate that such a complementary measure could lead to 250,000 additional jobs, with an expected improvement in job-seekers' welfare. * The authors thank Bruno Coquet, Etienne Lehmann, Fabrice Lenglart, Cyrile Nouveau and André Zylberberg for helpful comments. The authors alone are responsible for any omissions or other errors.
Contents
The implementation of the New Employment Contract (CNE) has introduced important changes that may have profound repercussions on the performance of the French labour market. The CNE is a indefinite-term contract that applies exclusively to small businesses of no more than twenty employees 1 .
Established on August 4th 2005, the CNE is a notable break with pre-existing labour contracts -namely the common right indefinite-term contract (CDI) and the fixed-term contract (CDD) -on two accounts .
For one, during the first two years, the CNE allows the employer to terminate the contract without having to provide an explanation; secondly, during those first two years, employers need only give their employees two week's notice before dismissal, and after six months the notice period is extended to one month 2 . The employer's obligation has been essentially reduced to complying with the severance procedure, which is also simplified under the CNE.
The CNE's effectiveness is often maintained by pointing to the 440,000 such contracts that were established during the first eight months of its existence (based on the statistics drawn from French firms' compulsory hiring count 3 ). It turns out this statistic does little more than to veil the difficulty of determining the reform's overall impact on job creation. We list a few reasons below.
For one, such a statistic does not capture the net variation of the number of jobs in the labour pool -it only reflects the number of hirings using the CNE. It is impossible to readily determine the reform's impact on the overall number of existing jobs from this statistic without taking into account labour flows.
For instance, it is worth noting that over 6 million workers flow in and out of employment in France every year. Furthermore, it is worth remembering that job turnover is higher in small businesses. In any given month, French businesses of less than twenty employees hire an estimated 250,000 new workers. Thus, the 440,000 CNE contracts that were established eight months after its outset only account for as much as 20% of worker flows among small businesses.
Secondly, it is reasonable to assume that a number of jobs created under the CNE have simply substituted jobs that would have been created under the CDD or CDI (had the CNE not existed).
Thirdly, we do not know a priori the survival rate of CNE jobs. Given the relative flexibility of the new contracts, it is likely that CNE jobs will be more easily destroyed than CDD and CDI contracts. In particular, employers may have a powerful incentive to terminate these contracts at the end of their twoyear trial (or "qualifying") period in order to avoid entering into the more binding phase of the contract with more stringent dismissal restrictions (i.e. a CDI with two years of seniority). Consequently, even if the CNE reform were to promote employment in the short run, the discrete jump in firing restrictions between the CNE and the CDI after the two-year qualifying period could significantly reduce its long-term impact on employment and unemployment. In fact, since the new contract fosters both job creation and job destruction, the CNE could even increase unemployment in the long-run. Ultimately, it all depends on how the job creation and job-destruction brought about by the reform off-set each other. The a priori ambiguity of policy, a phenomenon all too familiar to economists, calls for a deeper understanding of the reform's influence on unemployment and job creation.
In order to evaluate the impact of the CNE on unemployment, labour participation, employment and job "precariousness" (instability), 4 one must consider a dynamic representation of the labour market that reflects the significant labour flows observed today. With this in mind, we have created a model of the French labour market that captures both the extent of worker flows, as well as job opportunities under different labour contracts. Our model rests on a number of works published since 1990, the date at which available data started revealing a significant (and previously overlooked) degree of job creation and destruction, as well as significant worker flows.
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A few of these works have already analyzed the consequences of making fixed-term contracts available to employers, and conclude that these contracts lead to a minor decrease in unemployment at best, and may even lead to an increase in unemployment. Indeed, the apparent job creation brought about by an increase in fixed-term contracts may be more than offset by a decrease in the use of permanent contracts.
We intend to build upon these works by explicitly modeling the introduction of the CNE which, unlike the CDD, has the important distinction of not specifying an expiration date. Our model, which captures the French labour market before and after the implementation of CNE-type contracts, serves to evaluate the effectiveness of such contracts in reducing unemployment and creating jobs. The model was constructed with the ambition of accurately reflecting the chief characteristics of the French labour market before the reform, with the goal of estimating accurate orders of magnitude for the reform's effect on unemployment, job creation, and other variables of interest. The model considers a scenario in which CNE-type contracts are introduced into the French economy as a whole. Our analysis suggests that introducing the CNE increases both job creation and destruction, leading to a modest net increase of approximately 80,000 jobs during the first four years of the reform, and 70,000 jobs after 10 years.
Furthermore, by significantly reducing job stability, and only providing for a minor decrease in unemployment, we find that a CNE-type reform may reduce job-seekers' welfare. Specifically, we measure the average decrease in job-seekers' welfare to be equivalent to a 0.5% drop in revenue, which triggers a slight 4 We explicitly define the notion of "precariousness" below. In English, precariousness does not fully capture the meaning of precarité. We can use "job instability" for want of a better term.
5 Pissarides (2000) is an essential reference. 6 Blanchard and Landier (2002) and Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002) reduction in the participation rate. In sum, our model suggests that in the long-run the CNE may lead to a very modest increase in employment, but at the cost of a slight deterioration in welfare for those seeking employment. Bearing this in mind, we suggest that complementing CNE type contracts with a labour reform that (1) reduces the economic cost of firing but (2) offers more generous severance pay is likely to have a significant positive effect on both job creation and welfare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 briefly documents the regulatory changes brought about by the CNE. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework and the key numbers we used for calibration (the model itself is presented in the appendix). A last section presents our results regarding unemployment, job creation, labour participation, and welfare.
Regulatory changes brought about by the introduction of the CNE
The CNE is an indefinite-term contract that employers can terminate without having to provide an explanation during a two-year qualifying period. Within this period, after the first month employers are required to give two weeks' notice for severance of the contract, and after six months the notice period is extended to one month. After this two-year period, if the job survives, the regular protection laws for indefinite-term contracts apply. Prior to this labour reform, the CDD had the exclusive benefit of providing businesses with the flexibility of firing an employee at a low legal risk (i.e. at a low cost).
Namely, at the time, CDD contracts were the only alternative to CDI contracts which, given their more stringent firing restrictions, bear greater legal risks for the employer once the trial period is over.
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Let us now delve into the advantages and disadvantages of introducing CNE-type contracts from the standpoint of employers and employees, respectively. 8
Advantages and disadvantages of the new contracts relative to the CDD
A priori, CNE-type contracts offer a number of advantages for employers compared to the CDD, and even more advantages with respect to the CDI.
9
The CNE reform also provides a priori advantages for 7 Aside from the CDD, temp contracts are also used in France, but with less frequency as they are relatively costly and mostly used for very short assignments.
8 One main exception being the contrat d'usage, which is a special short-term contract reserved for certain jobs in specific sectors. Jobs under such a contract have the following characteristics: 1) severance pay is not obligatory (Article L 122-3-4); 2) the absence of a waiting period between the signature of two consecutive CDD contracts (Article L 122-3-11); 3) the absence of an official expiration date for the contract (Article L 122-1-2). The contrat d'usage may be used in the following industries: forestry, naval repair, moving, hospitality industry, performances, cultural activities, audiovisual, informational, teaching, movie production, polls, phonographic production, recreation and vacationing centers, stocking of meat, professional sports, construction work conducted abroad, engineering, research and technical cooperation conducted abroad, third-party associations (associations intermédiaires ), personal assistance associations (associations de services aux personnes ), scientific research conducted at international conventions.
9 These reforms have a broad range of applications. Nearly every type of job can be affected by the CNE, save shortterm, seasonal contracts. In particular, professions in the following industries are likely to be influenced: industrial and commercial activities, agricultural jobs that make use of article 1144 (1-7, 9-10) of the rural code, liberal professions, public and ministerial office-holders, house and family assistants, concierges and receptionists, maternity assistants, members of civil society groups, labour union members, sociétés mutualiste, private social security firms and associations, private law employees, but their gains are better assessed a posteriori (by observing job creation in the long-run).
For the employer
• Advantages: the new contracts offer three main advantages to the employer. First and foremost, an employer need not justify his use of a CNE, whereas using a CDD contract requires legal validation (French law stipulates eleven provisions justifying the use of a CDD).
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Furthermore, the CNE offers employers with the liberty of dismissing an employee at any time without having to provide legally-imposed justifications.
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Lastly, it is slightly less costly for the firm to sever a CNE contract than to bear the termination costs of a CDD contract (since the termination cost in the form of a payment to the employee at the end of a CDD, is subject to social taxes, whereas CNE severance pay is not.)
• • Advantages: the employee benefits from two types of advantages with respect to the CDD. First, in the event of dismissal, the CNE provides support more readily: after having reached four months of seniority the employee benefits from a daily payment of 16.40 euros for one month. However, under any other contract, an employee must have at least six months of seniority, during which time he must have made mandatory contributions to the national unemployment insurance scheme, before being eligible for unemployment benefit in the event of dismissal. Secondly, while the CNE organizations (associations ou organisme de droit privé). 1 0 In practice, given that 70% of all employees are hired under CDD contracts, it is obvious that adherence to the eleven legal provisions is often misreported. Still, even misreporting compliance is costly in terms of time.
1 1 A CDD contract has a very short trial-period, and in order to sever the contract, the employer must provide evidence of serious fault. Neither employee underperformance, nor economic pressure, nor even insolvent liquidation are sufficient grounds to dismiss an employee without the risk of legal contestation.
1 2 For an employer, firing an employee with two years of seniority bears certain costs: severance pay (both legal and conventional), legal costs (a delay of 12-24 months is expected before meeting before the industrial tribunal), and at least six-month's worth of gross salary for a dismissal that is not justified by law.
1 3 In particular, the French State Council judged that an employee could still challenge the severance of a CNE before the industrial council if the dismissal is deemed "abusive". Thus, the CNE's jurisprudence may be based on legal grounds similar to those that existed prior to the 1973 French labour law (which imposed proof of "real and serious grounds" for firing an employee).
is de jure considered a CDI for third parties (banks, creditors, etc.) , in practice it remains to be seen whether CNE contracts will benefit from this distinction instead of being pooled with CDD contracts.
• Disadvantages: under the CDD, the employee is guaranteed his salary up until the official, legallybound termination of his contract, even if the employer chooses to lay him off beforehand. Since no such official expiration date exists under a CNE, the employee obviously ceases to benefit from a full salary in the event of being laid off. If an employee is laid off under the CNE, he bears the added disadvantage of benefiting from less severance pay than under a CDD (8% and 10% of accrued income, respectively).
1.2 Advantages and disadvantages of the new contracts relative to the CDI
For the employer
• Advantages: the CNE provides the employer with near-unconditional flexibility when it comes to firing an employee, since the contract can be terminated without having to offer an explanation.
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The employer need only respect a simplified firing procedure, and he benefits from a shorter notice period.
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As mentioned above, two-weeks' notice is required if severance of the contract occurs after the first month, and one-month's notice if severance occurs after six-months into the contract (the CDI requires 1-3 months of notice). Moreover, in principle the CNE provides the employer with much less uncertainty as to the legal outcome of a potential contestation on behalf of the employee (in particular, legal challenges cannot take place without compelling grounds). However, as noted above, this advantage must be qualified seeing as the employee can still challenge a dismissal for breach of rights.
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• Disadvantages: laying-off an employee entails an immediate cost 17 to employers under CNE-type contracts, whereas with a CDI next to nothing is due during the first two years (there is no legallyimposed severance pay, and when companies offer such pay on their own accord, it is customarily very meager). Moreover, after severing a CNE, a waiting period of three months must be respected before re-hiring the same employee under a CNE.
1 4 Employees are still protected against dismissal under certain conditions (maternity leave, accidents, health issues, etc.). 1 5 The procedure is simplified to sending a dismissal notice by certified mail, without having to provide an explanation. Should the employer deem the employee is guilty of serious fault, the standard disciplinary procedure is followed as required by law. Dismissing a CNE worker that is part of a labour union must also comply with the legal conditions set out by the contract.
1 6 Under the CNE, absence of formal, written grounds for dismissing an employee does not free the employer from potentially having to justify "real and serious grounds" for severance of the contract in court. Employees that suspect they have been fired under conditions that fail to comply with French labour laws may bring their case to the industrial tribunal for breach of rights.
1 7 The immediate cost to the firm is 10 % of the total gross salary paid since the beginning of the contract: 80% of this cost goes to the dismissed employee, and the remaining 20% is a tax paid to the state.
For the employee
• Advantages: CNE-type contracts offer more substantial severance pay during the two first years in the event of a layoff: as mentioned above, an employee under a CDI with less than two years of seniority is not legally entitled to severance pay,
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and has less rights in the court of law. In addition, the CNE provides support more readily in the event of unemployment: 16.40 euros per day for one month, after four months of seniority (versus a minimum of 6 months of seniority and mandatory contributions under any other contract. See 1.1.2 supra)
• Disadvantages: for one, CNE-type contracts imply less job security during the first two years of the contract and offer a limited degree of legal recourse. Secondly, the firing procedure is expeditious,
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and the notice period is shorter (two weeks or one month for a CNE, versus 1-3 months for a CDI).
Substitution between new and pre-existing labour contracts
Listing the advantages and disadvantages of the CNE enables us to gain insight into the extent of the new contracts' expected replacement of CDD and CDI contracts. On the whole, it would seem that CNEtype contracts provide more advantages than disadvantages for businesses. Indeed, the disadvantages seem relatively modest. Nonetheless, a complete substitution of CDD and CDI contracts by CNE-type contracts seems unrealistic.
The degree to which CDD contracts are used after the introduction of the CNE reform will depend on whether such contracts retain a distinct function. For instance, CDD contracts that were used as a means of testing new employees for a few months before adopting a CDI will most likely be replaced by CNE-type contracts. However, a company may deem CDD contracts a useful means of adapting to predictable fluctuations in demand or to deal with temporary absences in their work-force. In establishing a contractual severance date, the CDD has the advantage of avoiding a standard lay-off. For even if layingoff an employee is greatly facilitated under a CNE, the very process of firing involves a "human cost" that is absent under a CDD's planned severance date. Thus, the CNE may not be the most suitable contract for businesses when dealing with predictable fluctuations in demand, or when replacing an employee that is temporarily on leave.
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Employers are likely to opt for a near-complete substitution of the CDI with CNE-type contracts due to their significantly longer qualification period (since a longer trial period reduces the risk of a costly severance at a future date). Nonetheless, we must bear in mind that the choice of a contract is not exclusively determined by the employer, but may be influenced by bargaining between the two parties.
Moreover, it may be in the employer's best interest to hire the more promising employees under a more secure contract, as an expression of approval and encouragement that may positively influence employee commitment.
The above suggests that one should expect a high degree of substitution. Intuitively, this substitution could seriously undermine the CNE labour reform's ambition of creating a significant number of jobs. Indeed, under the extreme case of a complete substitution of CDD and CDI contracts, there is no net job creation. However, even if the number of jobs stays more or less constant, substitution implies flooding the labour-market with very flexible contracts, which may increase the labour turn-over rate.
If, on the other hand, net jobs are created under the CNE in spite of a high degree of substitution, then perhaps unemployment can be reduced despite having facilitated the firing process. With this in mind,
we can see how nothing should be deduced from a mere statistic reflecting an increase in CNE contracts:
little can be drawn from the 440,000 CNE contracts that were established during the first eight months after its outset.
Modeling the labour force under different types of contracts
Our evaluation of the consequences of introducing CNE-type contracts into the French labour market is conducted in two steps. First, we will consider a model of the labour market with CDD and CDI contracts. This model accurately reflects the principal characteristics of the French labour market, such as the rate and average duration of unemployment, the average length of CDD and CDI contracts, and the proportion of CDD contracts in the economy. In turn, this theoretical framework is used to analyze the impact of introducing CNE-type contracts into the labour market.
The labour market prior to introducing new labour contracts

Job creation
At any given point in time, the number of jobs offered in the labour-market is determined by a freeentry condition: firms create jobs as long as they perceive opportunities for profit. That said, seeing as the recruitment process can be time-consuming and costly, a job offer rarely turns immediately into employment. Our model takes into account such hiring costs, as well as the way these costs vary with duration. In theory, CNE contracts are both less onerous and just as flexible as temp contracts, making them a good replacement for temp contracts that are two weeks or longer. In reality, most temp work is of very short duration, and we expect the CNE's effect on temp contracts to be trivial.
respect to the unemployment rate. In particular, if the unemployment rate is high, firms can find a suitable employee more readily, which reduces the cost of hiring. Moreover, firms are confronted with varying degrees of uncertainty: the profitability of each job contract varies (differently) throughout time. Given this uncertainty, employers have a natural preference towards using CDD rather than CDI contracts, even if this means (1) bearing higher total recruitment costs, since hiring is more frequent, and (2) running the risk of agreeing to a contract that becomes unprofitable before its legal expiration (i.e. wages are a sunk cost). However, seeing as French labour laws limit the use of CDD contracts, our model assumes an upper bound for the proportion of such contracts used by each firm. Bearing this in mind, we assume the French economy is made up of only CDD and CDI contracts for the time being.
Job destruction
In an economy with exclusively CDD and CDI contracts, firms can fire employees under two types of scenarios.
When a CDD reaches its date of expiration, employees lose their job unless the firm chooses to rehire them under a CDI contract. An obligatory termination payment equal to 10% of accrued income is awarded to employees who are not rehired. In the event an employee's contract is no longer profitable to a firm, we assume that the firm has no choice but to maintain the CDD until its date of expiration. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the duration of a CDD is not chosen by firms, but imposed.
The length of this imposed value is not arbitrary, but the average length of CDD contracts observed in the French economy.
The firm can also fire employees under a CDI contract, which generally occurs when maintaining the contract becomes unprofitable. In this case, we estimate the severance cost as corresponding to the employee's annual salary, which is roughly equal to the average cost of a dismissal in France (Kramarz and Michaud, 2004) .
Wage setting
The wage rate is taken as a given, imposed on both employers and employees. This hypothesis accurately captures the segment of the labour-market in which employees are paid minimum-wage. Thus, our analysis of the introduction of CNE contracts is most accurate for this particular segment of the labour-market.
For wages that are above minimum-wage, an approach that captures the bargaining process involved in determining salaries would be more appropriate. For instance, such an approach would account for an increase in salaries if the CNE reform lowers the unemployment rate. The expected general increase in salaries would in turn reduce the long-run impact CNE contracts have on reducing unemployment (but without annulling it altogether). As a result, our simplifying assumption that wages are held constant will tend to exaggerate the reform's effect on the unemployment rate.
CDD CDI
Unemployment
Figure 1: The structure of the labour market before the introduction of CNE-type contracts.
Employment and unemployment
The rate of unemployment and job-creation are determined by the firms' demand for labour and the labour force's supply. As we have just seen, the supply of jobs is determined by the free-entry condition, while the size of the labour force is essentially determined by competing incentives to enter or exit the labour force. Intuitively, any change in the labour market that increases the expected benefits of working or searching for a job will increase the size of the labour force. Recall that a person who enters the labour-market starts off by looking for a job. Given the imperfect flow of information, this process can be both long and costly: for any given position, the coexistence of a matching, but undiscovered supply and demand of labour is not uncommon.
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Next, once a person has been hired, he can lose his job at any given time, due to changes in the expected profitability of maintaining the contract for the employer. If need be, this person may choose to stay in the labour force as a job-seeker and become re-employed after an uncertain amount of time.
With this in mind, we can see how the fluctuations of employment and unemployment in a given labour market are influenced by the type of labour contracts used. For instance, given their relative flexibility, CDD contracts tend to increase both the rate of hire and the rate of dismissal. Conversely, CDI contracts tend to inhibit both hiring and firing, as severing such a contract is more costly. Figure 1 provides an illustration of the labour market's structure.
The labour after introducing new labour contracts
Job creation
We assume that CNE-type contracts provide the double benefit of having a lower severance cost than CDIs, as well as providing for greater flexibility than CDDs. Thus, employers will unambiguously prefer to hire employees under the CNE after its introduction, rather than to use CDI or CDD contracts. Consequently, our model assumes a gradual, complete replacement of CDD contracts. Given that CNE contracts must be turned into CDI contracts after the two-year trial period, these latter contracts outlive the CNE labour reform. As discussed earlier, in reality CDD contracts continue to be useful to employers, so their complete replacement is a simplifying assumption that tends to exaggerate the beneficial effect of CNE contracts on unemployment and employment.
Job destruction
The length of the trial period for CNE-type contracts is at most two years. During this period, firms can fire an employee at any given time, should maintaining the contract become unprofitable. The firm is legally required to pay a severance cost equal to 10 % of the total gross salary paid since the beginning of the contract: 80% of this cost goes to the dismissed employee, and the remaining 20% is a tax paid to the state. If the employee endures the two-year trial period, the firm must then decide whether to convert the CNE contract into a CDI, or to lay-off the worker and bear the 10% severance cost. In turn, a firm may sever a CDI contract if keeping the employee becomes unprofitable, but at a higher separation cost equal to one year's worth of salary (on average). It is worth noting that firms do convert a number of CNE contracts into CDI, deeming that the productivity of certain workers is sufficiently high to cover the risk of a more costly severance.
Employment and unemployment
Employment, unemployment, and the labour force participation rate are all determined by the supply and demand for labour, as was the case prior to the introduction of the CNE contracts. In particular, the employment and unemployment rates are determined by constant flows in hiring (under CNE contracts only), firing (under CNE and CDI contracts), and the converting of CNE contracts into CDIs. After the introduction of the CNE, all vacant jobs offered are under CNE contracts, and no jobs offered are CDD or CDI contracts. Given that CNE contracts offer more flexibility to the employer than CDD and CDI, the rate of job creation increases. Little by little, the share of CDD contracts in the labour pool decreases while the share of CNE jobs increases. In time, the CDD disappears and CNE contracts add up to a greater share of the labour pool than the CDD did before the labour reform. This new market structure, which reflects the complete replacement of CDD contracts, is illustrated in Figure 2 .
In the long-run, the impact of the CNE on the unemployment rate is ambiguous. While the flexible nature of this contract initially leads to job creation, the discontinuous rise in severance costs when converting a CNE into a CDI may compel employers to fire a large proportion of employees after the two-year trial period. After a rise in employment during the first two years of the CNE reform, the discontinuous jump in severance costs may create a threshold effect that results in a degree of job destruction that is equal to, or even greater than, the number of jobs created.
The relationship between unemployment rate and employment depends on fluctuations in the labour- 
A measure of "precariousness" : Welfare
It is often argued that a labour reform that increases the number of "unstable" or "precarious" jobs is misguided. That said, the concept of "precariousness" remains vague, and warrants a definition on the basis of clear criteria. For instance, is precariousness reduced if unemployment decreases via a higher turn-over rate (i.e. more frequent, but briefer unemployment spells)? Intuitively, the concept needs to take into account the interplay between a reduction in unemployment and a general increase in the turn-over rate (i.e. increase in job-instability).
An economic analysis may shed light on a definition of "precariousness". Namely, comparing the expected discounted utility of the unemployed 24 before and after the CNE labour reform can help us evaluate the potential trade-off between a labour-market with more, but less secure jobs. This tradeoff must take into account the degree to which individuals in the labour-force are risk-averse. For an unemployed individual with a high degree of risk-aversion, the benefit of having access to more jobs may be outweighed by the short-lived nature of these jobs. Once we have an empirical estimate of riskaversion, we can evaluate whether the interplay between job-creation and job-instability tends to increase, or decrease, average welfare. In sum, we can use the expected change in welfare induced by the CNE as a proxy for the change in "precariousness" perceived by French job-seekers after the reform.
3 Evaluating the impact of the new labour contracts using the model From a strictly theoretical standpoint, the model presented above cannot evaluate the CNE labour reform's impact on employment and unemployment. A number of questions remain: what will be the turn-over rate for CNE jobs? Will this rate dampen, annul, or perhaps even outweigh the welfare increasing effects of job-creation? Will the discontinuous jump in worker protection between CNE and CDI contracts considerably curb the labour-reform's ability to reduce unemployment in the mediumrun? Will the workers' average welfare increase or decrease? In order to shed light on these questions, we must now move on to a numerical application of our theoretical framework. After justifying the values used to calibrate our model, we will present our numerical assessment of the effect of CNE contracts on employment, labour participation, and unemployment.
Calibration of the model
The model captures the chief characteristics of the French labour market just before the introduction of the CNE (i.e. the unemployment rate, the average duration of unemployment spells, the average duration of jobs, the proportion of CDD contracts, and severance costs as a function of salary). 
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Our model takes into account the entirety of the French population that is of working age (i.e. between 15-64 years of age). The economy is taken to have a 10% unemployment rate, a participation rate of 70%, and an employment rate of 63%.
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Drawing from the most recent available data in 2003, the average duration of employment (in the non-agricultural for-profit sector) is equal to 110 months, and the average duration of an unemployment spell is 12 months. The fraction of CDD contracts in the labour-market (excluding very short, seasonal contracts) is 5% ,
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and they account for 70% of all starting contracts.
Moreover, excluding seasonal contracts, 70% of CDD contracts are converted into CDIs (Goux, Maurin, and Pauchet, 2001 ). The length of CDD contracts is more difficult to determine, and has been reported as either 5 months, or 10-12 months, depending on the source.
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We therefore adopt an intermediate Only CDD contracts of more than 30 days in duration, and that are in the non agricultural trade sector are considered here (INSEE 2003 Labour Survey) . The share of short-term employment in the labour pool that also includes temp jobs and government subsidized employment is significantly higher (approximately 12%).
2 9 According to EMMO-DMMO (Survey on Labour Flows, 2002) the average duration of a CDD job is 5 months, whereas value of 8 months for the average length of CDD contracts.
The legal obligations of each contract are also taken into consideration. The severance cost under CDD contracts is 10% of the total gross wage paid since the beginning of the contract -unless the contract is transformed into a CDI. The cost of severing a CDI is equal to one year's worth of salary (Kramarz and Michaud, 2004) .
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We assume that one-third of these severance costs are procedural in nature (i.e.
paid to third parties), while the remainder corresponds to the worker's severance compensation. The trial-period under a CNE contract is two years, and the severance cost is equal to 8% of the total gross salary paid. A job-seeker's net income is taken to be 70% of his net salary.
Other structural characteristics of the French labour-market are also reflected in our model. The elasticity of job-destruction (for CDD and CDI contracts) for low-wage employment is estimated at 1.5
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, and the elasticity of supply is taken to be 20% (Laroque and Salanié, 2000) .
Expected impact in job creation
We examine the impact of the CNE labour reform under two different scenarios. First, we assume that the reform has no influence on the size of the labour force. Next, we consider the more realistic situation in which the labour force is not constant, in order to better assess the underlying forces that affect unemployment and job-creation.
The reform's effects on unemployment under a constant labour participation rate
A large degree of uncertainty and imprecision exists as to which economic variables significantly influence the size of the labour force. This uncertainty justifies a first scenario in which we take the labourforce to be unresponsive to any expected benefits or losses arising from the CNE's introduction into the labour-market. Given this assumption, Figure 3 illustrates the impact of the CNE on employment in the non-agricultural for-profit sector. The left-hand side of the figure shows the variation in the employment rate, which is equal to the ratio of the employed population to the working-age population. On the right, we have the number of jobs in the non-agricultural for-profit sector as a function of time after the introduction of the CNE (jobs start at the value of 16, and are expressed in millions). As we can see, employment increases abruptly during the first two years, stabilizes at its peak, and then slightly decreases. If we assume that the CNE contract is applied to the non-agricultural for-profit sector as the INSEE 2003 Labour Survey holds the average duration to be 10-12 months. This notable difference is present across all years considered. The EMMO-DMMO data is provided by firms, while the INSEE data is based on questionnaires completed by households. The former data set tends to have a downward bias on estimated CDD length (accounting for successive renewals of contracts on the same jobs as separate contracts ), while the latter tends to overstate CDD duration (difficulty in accounting for very short contracts). 3 0 This estimate takes into account the direct costs incurred by firms, including third-party transaction costs. Also, while the estimate does not explicitly take into account additional litigation costs, more often than not this cost is implicitly added during severance negotiation. However, the estimate does not take into account the opportunity costs of firing-i.e. opportunities foregone because of resources used during the procedure, etc.
3 1 This means a 1% increase in the average salary would bring about a 1.5% in the job-destruction rate. a whole, then a long run projection predicts the creation of 100,000 jobs, which amounts to a 0.35% increase in employment. The CNE contract's strong initial impact reflects its capacity to create jobs in the short-run. However, seeing as CNE contracts have a shorter life-span than CDI contracts, employers are compelled to actively substitute CDI contracts with CNEs, leading to an increase in job-destruction (in the long-run, CNE jobs represent18% of the labour pool, and slightly less than one out of two of these jobs endure the two-year trial period). Job-destruction is most apparent at the end of the first-two years, when employers must decide whether to terminate their CNE contracts (and hire new employees) or to convert these contracts into CDI.
A priori, our model only allows us to estimate the impact of the introduction of CNE-type contracts on the labour-market as a whole. A more specific assessment of the contracts' impact on a particular segment of the labour market (such as that of small businesses, or of the youth) would require explicitly modeling both the segment of interest and the general model. That said, our model provides orders of magnitude for the labour reform's impact on employees working for small businesses of less than twenty employees. Given that these employees account for approximately one-third of all employees from the for-profit sector, a first estimate can be obtained by ignoring the potential specificity of small businesses.
Namely, if we assume that one-third of the reform's global effect applies to small businesses, approximately 35,000 net jobs are expected to be created in the long-run. Another approach would take into account the specificity of small businesses: the average length of employment is 83 months (as opposed to an average of 110 months, all firms considered), and CDD
32
contracts represent 7% of all of their contracts (INSEE 2003 Enquête Emploi, a household survey on employment). With these specificities in mind, we estimate CNE contracts will have a more marked influence on small businesses; the reform could account for the creation of up to 70,000 net jobs (while small businesses only account for one-third of the total workforce). Figure 4: The evolution in the number of net jobs created (expressed in thousands) following the introduction of CNE-type contracts for firms of less than twenty employees in the for-profit sector
The CNE reform's more pronounced effect on job-creation in the small-business sector can be explained by (1) the larger fluctuations in labour-force participation and (2) the greater turn-over rate found in this sector (which is approximately twice of that found in businesses of more than 20 employees). It follows that the introduction of flexible labour-contracts would benefit small businesses more than their larger counterparts.
The reform's effects on employment under a variable labour participation rate
We will now consider how the labour-force participation rate might vary with the introduction of the CNE reform. In particular, we take the long-term elasticity of the labour participation rate (with respect to salary) to be equal to 20%. It is assumed that the participation rate gradually adjusts itself to the modifications introduced by the reform. In particular, we take the medium adjustment period as equal to six months.
33 Figure 5 illustrates the consequences of introducing the CNE on the economy as a whole.
Under this scenario, the reform's long-term effect is weaker since it reduces the labour participation rate. Namely, for reasons we will go into below, fewer people participate in the labour-force after the reform, which reduces the overall level of employment. Still, under our current hypothesis of a variable participation rate, in the long run the for-profit sector could experience a net increase of 70,000 jobs.
Overall, ten years into the CNE labour reform, the employment rate is expected to have increased by 0.3 percentage points. These estimates vary according to certain hypotheses underpinning the model (cf infra). Figure 5: Evolutions in the employment rate (left) and the number of net jobs created (right, expressed in thousands) following the introduction of CNE-type contracts in the for-profit sector, when taking into account changes in the participation rate.
Expected impact on welfare and the labour participation rate
How the new labour contract will affect the living conditions of those participating in the labour-market is a priori ambiguous. Two contending forces are at work: the CNE reform provides firms with more flexible contracts, which increase the quantity of jobs offered, in turn improving job prospects for job seekers. Still, the new employment offered is less stable, thus reducing labour-force participants' living conditions.
Our model reveals that the latter, negative effect outweighs the former, resulting in a net decrease in living conditions for individuals in the workforce equivalent to 0.47% of their revenue. For some, this decrease in living conditions is incentive enough to leave the labour-force, causing a slight decrease in the labour-force participation rate. Figure 6 illustrates the evolution of the participation rate and the labour force after the CNE is introduced in the economy as a whole. The participation rate decreases slightly which translates to a reduction in the labour-force of approximately 20,000 individuals. All things considered, introducing the CNE does not help firms hire employees more readily. On the contrary, by at once increasing firms' demand for work while decreasing the supply of labour, the CNE reform may be making it more difficult for businesses to hire.
Expected impact on unemployment
The labour reform's impact on the unemployment rate and the number of unemployed can be deduced from the evolution of employment and the participation rate after the CNE's outset. Figure 7 illustrates this impact: the left hand side takes the labour participation rate as constant, while the right hand side allows this rate to vary.
When the participation rate is held constant, changes in unemployment can be directly drawn from variations in employment (as illustrated in Figure 3 ). An estimated improvement of 95,000 less unem- Figure 7: The evolution of the unemployment rate (left) and the variation in the number of unemployed workers (right, expressed in thousands) following the introduction of CNE-type contracts in the for-profit sector, without taking into account changes in the participation rate. Figure 8: The evolution of the unemployment rate (left) and the variation in the number of unemployed workers (right, expressed in thousands) following the introduction of CNE-type contracts in the for-profit sector, when taking into account changes in the participation rate.
ployed individuals are expected in the long-run if the reform is applied to the non-agricultural for-profit sector as a whole. Correspondingly, the unemployment rate decreases by approximately 0.5 percentage points, bringing the long-term unemployment rate to 9.5%.
Under the hypothesis of a variable participation rate, it turns out the number of unemployed individuals decreases by nearly the same amount as when the rate was held constant (Figure 8 ), even though the reform's impact on the level of overall employment is weaker due to the smaller labour-force ( Figure 5 ).
In particular, the number of unemployed individuals decreases not only because of a greater rate of hire (which decreases with time), but also because a number of individuals leave the labour-force. Thus, a drop in the number of unemployed individuals also depends on how the labour participation rate reacts to the labour-reform. All in all, even under a variable participation rate, the model still estimates an overall improvement of 95,000 less unemployed individuals in the span of 15 years. Under the dual effect of temporarily renewed job-creation and a reduction in the labour-force, unemployment drops significantly during the first two years of the labour reform but rises slightly afterwards.
The ratio of unemployed individuals to the labour force, i.e. the unemployment rate, also decreases.
Soon after introducing the CNE, the unemployment rate drops appreciably under the combined effect of a temporary rise in the number of jobs and a reduction in the size of the labour force. But, as the end of the two year trial-period draws near, the overall level of employment begins to decrease due to a drop in the participation rate, and the number of lay-offs increases, resulting in a rise in the unemployment rate.
Ultimately, regardless of whether or not the participation rate is held constant, the unemployment rate stabilizes at a lower value than before the reform: the long-run equilibrium has been reached.
Robustness of results
In order to evaluate the robustness of the results just presented, we must evaluate how these results react to minor changes in the calibrated values underpinning our model. Indeed, even if we sought to capture the chief characteristics of the French labour market as accurately as possible, the inherent degree of uncertainty that exists for each variable calls for the testing of alternate calibrations. in the first row the elasticity of job offers has a value of 0.2 under the base calibration, and the new value is 0.4 which accounts for an additional 45,000 jobs (versus +70,000 under the baseline calibration, as displayed in the last row). Table 1 indicates that doubling the labour-supply elasticity from 20% to 40% would lead to the creation of 45,000 new jobs in ten years instead of the 70,000 jobs expected under the original calibration.
Intuitively, if the supply of labour is more elastic to changes in the labour-market, the anticipated decrease in welfare perceived by job-seekers after the CNE's introduction will lead to a greater number of people exiting the labour-force. A decrease in the labour force is not conducive to increasing the overall level of employment.
The elasticity of job-destruction with respect to salary is another variable whose true value is veiled in uncertainty. For the minimum-wage sector of the labour-market, we use Kramarz and Philippon's elasticity estimate of 1.5. For wages higher than minimum-wage, we can expect a lower elasticity, since firms benefit from the added possibility of lowering their employees' income instead of firing them altogether.
For this sector of the labour-market (above minimum-wage), the introduction of CNE-type contracts would have a more significant effect on employment than if the elasticity of job-destruction were high, since lay-offs at the end of the trial-period would be less frequent. To illustrate this point, we note that an elasticity of 1.3 leads to both a greater increase in employment (+85,000) and a greater decrease in unemployment (-115,000). Moreover, if we couple this lower elasticity with an expected 1% increase in salaries following the labour-reform, the participation rate remains constant but fewer jobs are created (+40,000). Table 1 reveals that under a higher elasticity of job-destruction, the labour-reform has a more modest effect on employment. For instance, if the elasticity is raised from 1.5 to 1.8, the CNE's impact on employment is reduced from +70,000 to +60,000.
Our original hypothesis in which salaries do not change in response to the labour reform is undoubtedly an oversimplification. Seeing as the reform's affect on the unemployment rate is unambiguous (it decreases in all cases considered), we should expect a rise in salaries. In turn, this increase in salaries should curb the reform's impact on the unemployment rate. As evidence, we examine an exogenous 1% increase in salaries after the introduction of the CNE: only 30,000 jobs are created and the unemployment rate decreases by a meager 0.2%. An exogenous increase in salaries of 2% could even lead to an increase in unemployment.
In terms of severance costs, we have until now assumed that on average businesses pay the equivalent of one year's worth of salary to terminate a CDI contract. This hypothesis is drawn from Kramarz and Michaud (2004) econometric study. In addition, we have assumed that 2/3 of this severance cost goes to the employee as severance pay. If we were to assume that only half of the severance cost is allotted to the employee (i.e. 6 months-worth of salary), we observe that the level of unemployment and the level of employment are nearly unchanged (the reform's effect on the employment rate is slightly weaker).
Similarly, if we assume that the severance cost for businesses is less than a year's worth of salary,
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the results change only slightly. As illustrated in Table 1 , when the severance cost is set at 2/3 of annual salary, the reform would only create an estimated 40,000 net jobs; if the severance cost were to be reduced to 1/3 of annual salary, the reform's impact on job creation is even more modest (+20,000 jobs). Thus, as was anticipated, the CNE reform is more effective the greater the CDI's severance costs.
In our original calibration, we took the average length of a CDD contract to be 8 months (excluding CDDs of less than 30 days from our sample). However, this value varies depending on the source: in the INSEE 2003 Enquête Emploi the average length is reported as 10 months. Adopting this latter value, we find our results nearly unchanged (Table 1) .
As was previously discussed when we considered small businesses, the effects of the CNE reform are more pronounced for businesses (and industries) with a high turn-over rate-i.e. businesses that have a greater need for flexible labour contracts. Moreover, industries in which businesses are rarely subject to productivity-shocks or demand-shocks will be less responsive to the CNE-type reforms
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(a net increase of 60,000 jobs instead of 70,000 if the arrival rate of shocks is 10% lower).
4 Conclusion: the advantages of a single labour contract?
Three main conclusions can be drawn from our analysis:
• First, the introduction of CNE reform in the French economy is expected to have a weak, positive effect on job creation a few years after its outset. Under the most realistic calibration of our model, the labour-reform causes a slight increase in the overall level of employment, but reduces the size of the labour force in the long-run.
• Next, the CNE reform makes most of its impact during the first two-years of its existence. The significant, discontinuous jump in worker protection (e.g. severance costs for the firm) when moving from the extended trial-period to a CDI contract stops the growth of employment two years after the reform was initiated and even induces a slight decrease from the third year onward. This threshold effect bears certain policy implications: when evaluating ex-post the success of the CNE-labour reform, one should be careful and refrain from ascribing too much importance to results obtained just after a few months, seeing as the medium/long-run effects of reform are likely to be more modest.
• Lastly, in making jobs less secure for employees, the labour-reform is expected to have a negative impact on job-seekers' welfare. The increase in job insecurity is a direct result of the discontinuity in severance costs introduced by the reform-a discontinuity that incites firms to terminate contracts after the trial-period.
Our conclusions are consistent with the extant literature on the consequences of extending the use of CDD contracts (Blanchard and Landier, 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay, 2002) . These studies suggest that policies which make the labour-market more flexible at the margin are fairly ineffectual; such marginal reforms tend to artificially increase the turn-over rate and have a very modest effect on job-creation, while having potentially harmful effects on welfare. On the other hand, a more comprehensive labour-reform may prove more fruitful. In particular, a reform that instituted a tax on layoffs as a substitute for (1) the internal reassignment of employees, and (2) substantial legal and administrative costs (the procedural costs), could reduce job instability and boost job creation. (Blanchard and Tirole, 2003 , Cahuc and Malherbet, 2004 , Cahuc and Kramarz, 2005 , Boeri and Garibaldi, 2006 .
To further illustrate this type of results for France, we have simulated a more comprehensive reform that would have the ambition, in addition to the changes brought about by the CNE reform, of eliminating procedural severance costs in case of layoff for economic reasons (specifically, in the non-agricultural forprofit sector). As such, we assume employees would receive 8 months of salary in case of severance, which corresponds to the current average payment
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. Besides, we assume firms would benefit from simplified procedures
38
, which would reduce the cost of severing a CDI contract to 8-months' worth of salary in total (as opposed to 1-years' worth of salary). As illustrated in Figure 9 , such a reform is approximately four-times more effective in creating jobs than the introduction of the CNE (+250,000 jobs). Moreover, individuals participating in the labour-force would see their welfare unchanged, or even increase slightly by an amount equivalent to 0.11% of their income.
This latter scenario is an example of a single labour contract as put forth by Blanchard and Tirole (2003) and Cahuc and Kramarz (2004) . These studies suggests that it is possible to implement a labour reform that significantly increases job-creation and reduces the unemployment rate without decreasing job-seekers' welfare. Our projections indicate that under the current reform, CNE-type contracts fall short of this objective. However, another reform complementing the introduction of the CNE may prove quite effective: striking a balance between substantially reducing the procedural costs of severing a contract and offering more generous severance pay seems to be the most promising way of ensuring both job-creation and welfare improvement. Figure 9: The impact of the CNE reform in the non-agricultural for-profit sector when also accompanied by (1) a reduction of the procedural costs of economically motivated dismissals and (2) compensated by an increase in the legally imposed severance pay.
Appendix
Drawing on Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) Each job produces x units of the numeraire good per unit of time. The productivity of jobs changes at a rate λ. Given this rate of change, each new productivity x is randomly drawn from a distribution with an interval
We begin by representing the French labour market with CDD and CDI contracts. We then introduce CNEtype contracts into the labour-market.
The labour-market with CDD and CDI contracts
We first define the value of employment in order to propose how the firm might evaluate the costs and benefits of creating or destroying jobs. In turn, this will enable us to determine the unemployment rate and the labour-force participation rate.
The value of employment
We define the expected profit of a CDD contract Π d (x) , via the Bellman equations. Wages and productivity are noted as w d and x respectively. We have:
where µ d is the rate of destruction of CDD, Π(x) is the value of a CDI contract with productivity x, and Πv is the value of a vacant position. An individual whose CDD contract has been severed may either leave the firm or continue with the firm under a CDI; f d is the termination pay received by the employee at the end of the contract.
The length of a CDD contract is then 1/µ d .
We assume that a CDI contract may be severed after a productivity-shock, the firm incurring a total severance cost equal to f . This value is an average approximation, seeing as it does not take into account seniority (e.g. the legally imposed severance pay rises significantly after ten years of seniority). If Π(x) is the value of a CDI contract with a productivity x, we have:
where w represents the wages received under the CDI. If we take Πv = 0, equation (2) can be expressed as follows:
Job-destruction
We establish a productivity threshold, R, where Π(R) = −f, and under which CDI contracts are destroyed:
Similarly, R d is the productivity threshold below which a CDD contract is not transformed into a CDI, which
Πd(x) can be expressed in terms of the model's parameters (variables). We can distinguish between two cases.
which implies
By eliminating the expression (6a) and (8a) we obtain an explicit representation of
this enables us to explicitly calculate Π d (x).
Job-creation
We assume that firms can only hire employees under CDD contracts in a given proportion, α. This proportion takes into account French regulation which legally limits a firm's recourse to CDD contracts (most legal provisions relate to the temporary nature of such contracts). New CDD contracts are drawn from the distribution G.
The value of a vacant position is expressed as follows:
Where θ is the tightness of the labour-market, m(θ) is the probability of an unemployed individual discovering a vacant position, and h is the recruitment cost.
We take R c as the threshold value of productivity, above which an individual is hired under a CDI contract.
When Π(R c ) = 0, we have
The threshold value of productivity above which workers are hired under a CDD, denoted by R 
The value of a vacant position can thus be expressed as:
The free-entry condition Πv = 0 can be written as:
This last equation, given our representations for the value of jobs and the thresholds for their destruction, allows us to find the labour-market's equilibrium tightness.
The equilibrium values for the variables θ, R d , R, R 
The work-force
The labour-force participation rate ℓ/L is obtained by analyzing the trade-off between entering and exiting the labour-force. Individual preferences are represented by a utility function that is increasing and concave with respect to disposable income: v(·) + χξ where ξ ∈ R is the value of leisure and χ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of zero if an individual partakes in the labour-force, and the value of one otherwise. We assume that individuals not partaking in the labour-force receive a constant flow of disposable income, χ. There exist different values of z and ξ. For each pair of values z and ξ is associated a value for inactivity, equal to the discounted value of utility when not active. The cumulative distribution function of the expected discounted utilities of inactive individuals is denoted by F. In this context, individuals decide to participate in the labour market if the expected discounted utility of job-seeking, noted Vu, is greater than their expected discounted utility when inactive. Therefore, the participation rate, ℓ/L, is equal to F (V u ).
We assume that the participation rate progressively takes on its long-term value, F (Vu).
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This hypothesis is reasonable given imperfect information. Individuals outside of the labour-force are not readily informed of labourmarket conditions; similarly, individuals within the labour-force are not immediately aware of living conditions once they exit the labour-market. In other words, the growth of the labour-force can be expressed by the following
Thus, we must define Vu in order to establish the labour-force participation rate. For theoretical purposes, we need to adopt a unique conception of severance pay, for firms disburse this pay to their employees for an infinitesimally brief amount of time. Namely, our simplifying assumption is that workers perceive severance pay as a constant flow of money equal to the discounted value of the severance pay they expect to receive throughout their career. This flow is noted as ϕ. Unemployed individuals receive an additional disposable income, b. Thus, the value function of unemployment, V u can be expressed as follows:
Where V 0 d designates a CDD contract with a productivity level sufficiently high enough to ensure its change into a CDI once the trial period is over (because R 
where V 1 d stands of the value of a CDD contract with a productivity level too low to ensure its change into a CDI.
The contract is severed at the end of the trial period:
and V satisfies rV = v(w + ϕ) + λG(R) (Vu − V ) .
Unemployment
The unemployment rate is calculated from the equations tracing fluctuations in unemployment and the creation and destruction of each of the different contracts. We distinguish between the contracts as follows: n du is the number of CDD contracts that were not subject to a productivity shock; n d is the number of CDD contracts that were subject to a productivity shock; n represents the total number of CDI contracts; and U is the sum of all unemployed individuals. We take the working-age population as constant, and equal to L; we note ℓ as the size of the labour-force. If we assume that only unemployed individuals enter and exit the labour-force, we have:
The steady-state unemployment rate, u, is equal to U/ℓ, and is expressed as follows:
6.2 The labour-market after the introduction of the CNE The labour-market equilibrium after the introduction of CNE-type contracts is determined using the same approach as above, where only CDD and CDI contracts were considered.
The value of jobs
Let Πe (x) be the value of a CNE position with productivity x. For the sake of clarity we take Πv = 0 and consider Bellman's equation where
where we is the salary paid under a CNE contract, fe is the severance cost, and µ e is the rate at which CNE contracts are transformed into CDI.
Job-destruction
The productivity threshold, R, under which CDI contracts are destroyed, is still defined by equation (3). Moreover, we take Rt as the productivity threshold under which CNE contracts are left to expire without being transformed into CDD. In particular, Π(R t ) = −f e which can be expressed as
Seeing as Πe(x) > Π(x)" it follows that the "destruction threshold" for CNE contracts, Re such that Πe(Re) = −fe, is less than Rt. In order to explicitly calculate the value of a CNE contract, we must thus distinguish between two cases:
By calculating the difference between Πe(x) and Πe(Re), we can write:
we note that
therefore, the value of a CNE contract can be expressed as:
and the destruction threshold for CNE-type contracts Re, such that Πe(Re) = −fe, is written as:
6.2.3 Job-creation
All new jobs are created using CNE contracts. The creation threshold for a CNE-contract respects Πe (R c e ) = 0 and is expressed as:
The value of a vacant position Πv corresponds to:
The free-entry condition, Πv = 0, is written as:
Ultimately, the equilibrium values for the variables θ, R, Rt, Re are defined by a system of four equations: (3), (15), (17), (19).
The labour-force
The size of the labour-force is calculated in the same manner as when the labour-market consisted of only CDD and CDI contracts: the participation rate is equal to F (V u ). We must thus calculate an unemployed individual's expected utility in the labour-market with CNE contracts. The value of unemployment Vu is expressed as: Where V 1 e specifies the value of a CNE-job that will be severed after its trial period due to a low productivity level: The value of a CDI-contract is represented by: rV = v(w + ϕ) + λG(R) (Vu − V ) .
Unemployment
Unemployment is determined using the same approach as above (6.1.5) in which we considered the flow of job creation and destruction for each type of contract. Given that the destruction threshold and creation threshold for a CNE contract are different (Re and R c e , respectively) -it is again helpful to distinguish between the contracts. We take neu to be the number of CNE contracts which were no subject to productivity shocks; ne is the number of CNE contracts that underwent a productivity shock; nei is the number of CDI contracts; U captures the total number of unemployed individuals. As above, if we assume that only unemployed individuals enter and exit the labour-force, we have:ṅ eu = [1 − G(R Transitory Dynamics
To calculate the transitory dynamics that occur between the two labour regimes (e.g. before and after the introduction of the CNE), we start by defining our initial conditions: the steady-state values predicted by our model for a labour-market with exclusively CDD and CDI contracts. Next, we model a transition period during which it is no longer possible for the unemployed to be hired under a CDD or CDI contract.
In this context the system of equations that captures the dynamics of the stock of jobs under CDD contracts (n du , and n d ), as well as of the stock of jobs under CDI contracts before the reform (n), can be expressed as follows:ṅ
Similarly, the dynamics of the stock of jobs under CNE contracts (neu and ne), as well as CDI contracts hired after the introduction of the labour-reform (ni), is written as: At any given point in time, unemployment is defined by the identity:
where ℓ is the number of individuals in the labour-force, which is determined by a differential equation:
Calibration
The We must choose the values of 15 parameters r, f d , f, η, z, δ, α, µ d , m0, λ, h, x inf , w, V inf , Vsup (we assume we =
The first 6 parameters are chosen as follows:
-The annual discount rate is r = 0, 05;
-The termination costs of a CDD contract f d , equal to 10 % of the total gross salary paid since the beginning of the contract, is expressed as 0.1w/µ d ; -The cost of severing a CDI contract, f , is equal to 100% of the annual salary: 2/3 of this sum is paid to the dismissed worker, the remaining 1/3 are procedural costs.
-The elasticity of the matching function is of the form m(θ) = m0θ −η , with η = 0.5; -The median adjustment time for the labour force ∆ is taken to be six months, such that ∆ = 1/2 which implies δ = 2/e ∆ = 1, 2.
-b designates a job-seeker's immediate gain, which we take to be 70% of the salary w.
The remaining 9 parameters are chosen to reflect:
-The proportion of jobs created under CDD contracts, α = 0, 7;
-The duration of CDD contracts, 1/µ d = 1/1, 5 (i.e. 8 months)
-The unemployment rate u = 0, 1;
-The average duration of jobs, which is equal to 110 months. Since there is a transfer of µ d G(Rd)nd +λG(R)n workers from employment into unemployment per unit of time, the average duration of employment (which is equal to the inverse of the average rate of job-destruction) can be expressed as (
-The proportion of CDD contracts in the total stock of jobs: (n du + n d )/(n du + n d + n), equal to 5%.
-The duration of unemployment 1/θm(θ)[αG(R -The elasticity of the rate of job-destruction with respect to salary,
, which we assume to be equal to 1.5 (see Kramarz and Philippon, 2003) . We use short-run elasticity by (1) taking the appropriate stock of jobs, and (2) by taking into account only variations in productivity thresholds, which vary directly with changes in income.
-The participation rate (Vu − V inf )/(Vsup − V inf ) is equal to 70%, and the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to salary is taken to be 0.2.
Values for all fifteen parameters are presented in Table 2 . When the labour-market includes CNE contracts, recall that these contracts must be transformed into CDI or terminated after an average of two years, such that µ e = 0, 5 The severance pay received by a worker is equal to 8% of his total gross salary, while the employers severance cost is 10% of the worker's total gross salary. These figures are calculated for the average duration of CNE contracts, estimated to be 1.62 years.
